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SUMMARY 
Since the pre-requisites for common-purpose liability where there was no 
prior agreement were laid down in S V Mgedezi 1989 (I) SA 687 (A), the 
appellate division has moved to resolve related controversial issues. These 
include the question whether a joiner-in is a perpetrator or accomplice, and 
whether he should be convicted of murder or attempted murder. 
It is the question of dissociation which has remained elusive. Courts accept 
that a person should only be criminally liable when his dissociation from a 
common purpose takes place after the commencement of execution stage is 
reached. My submission is that whether one dissociates himself should be a 
question of fact, to be determined according to the circumstances of each 
case. Such determination should pay close attention to the doctrine of 
proximity. Where a person played a minor role, or acted under the influence 
of a dominant partner, this should be reflected in the punishment imposed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of common purpose has been applied by the South 
African courts for some decades now. 1 It has through the years 
undergone evolution in which the courts have attempted to re-define its 
content and extent of application. The attempt has not always been 
successful because in their attempts to refine the doctrine the courts have 
at times unwittingly extended its scope.2 However, the courts have in 
their latest decisions attempted to limit liability by emphasizing that: 
(i) common purpose cannot extend to culpability. 3 The mens 
rea of each participant must be determined independently 
and without reference to the mental state of the other 
participants. 
(ii) a joiner- in, in those cases where common purposes has not 
been established, may be liable only for attempted murder.4 
It is the practice of the courts to restrict active association within 
the pre-requisites as laid down in S v Mgedezi. 5 
1 One of the earliest cases in which the doctrine was applied was R v Garnsworthy 1923 WLD 17. 
2 This is arguably the case in S v Nzo l 990 (3) SA 1 (A). 
3 CR Snyman Criminal Lmv 3 ed. (1995) 253. The author states that "The liability of an associate 
in a common purpose to commit an unlawful act depends upon his own culpability (intention)." 
4 In S v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A) Botha AJA stated that a joiner-in is an accomplice, not a 
perpetrator. This view was finally rejected in Sv Motaung 1990 (4) SA 485 (A) at 520F-G where 
Hoexter JA held that where a joiner-in had done nothing to expedite the death ofY, he could not 
be found guilty of murder but only of attempted murder. 
1989 (1) SA 678 {A) at 705G - 706B. This matter is discussed in Chapter 2 C infra. 
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A The meaning of the doctrine 
The doctrine has English origins, and was first introduced in South 
Africa through section 78 of the Native Territories Penal Code. 6 This Act had 
limited jurisdiction as it did not apply to all areas or persons in the Cape 
Colony.7 Common purpose outside the jurisdiction conferred by this Act was 
first applied in South Africa in R v Garnsworthy8 and was formulated as 
follows: 
"Where two or more persons combine in an undertaking for an 
illegal purpose, each one of them is liable for anything done by 
the other or others of the combination, in the furtherance of their 
object, if what was done was what they knew or ought to have 
known, would be a probable9 result of their endevouring to 
achieve their object. If, on the other hand what is done is 
something which cannot be regarded as naturally and reasonably 
incidental to the attainment of the object of the illegal 
combination, then the law does not regard those who are not 
themselves personally responsible for the act as being liable; but 
if what is don@ is just what anybody engaging in the illegal 
combination would naturally, or ought naturally to know would 
be the obvious and probable result of what they were doing, then 
all are responsible." 
6 Act 24of1886 (C). 
The earliest application of the provisions of s 78 was in R v Taylor 1920 EDL 318, a case which 
involved participation in a strike by the students of Lovedale College in Alice. 
8 Supra (n 1) at 19. 
9 The courts have now substituted the word "probable" by "possible" in describing the nature of the result 
that must be foreseen. See S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (A). 
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The above formulation may have been appropriate for its time and 
for the facts of that case, but later developments have exposed its 
inadequacies. It has been criticised for introducing an objective test by 
using the phrases 'ought to have known' and 'probable' in place of 
'possible'. 10 The subjective test requires foresight that a possible (as 
opposed to probable) result might occur or a circumstance exist. The 
Garnsworthy formulation says much about the basis of liability of the 
participants in a common purpose, but little about a situation where 
some members subsequently dissociate themselves from the criminal 
conduct. Earlier cases also failed to address the vexing problem of 
causation in common purpose liability. 11 
B The purpose of the doctrine 
The plausible result of the doctrine is that it facilitates conviction 
where more than one person participates in criminal conduct. This is 
especially so where it is not easy for the prosecution to tell (in the case 
of, for example, murder) who actually caused the death of Y. Liability is 
simply founded on the principle of imputation. The acts of X are 
imputed to Z if both X and Z had a common design and the result of 
their criminal act falls within that common design. This is so even 
where causation has not been established. 12 
10 It should be noted, however, that at that time the courts had not yet clearly applied a subjective test for 
intention. With respect to intention do/us eventua/is had not been developed as it is today. 
11 This refers in particular to cases before S v Thoma 1969 (I) SA 385 (A). Botha JA in Sv Sa.fatso 1988 
(1) SA 868 (A) at 895D-I cited R v Malinga 1963 (l) SA 693 (A), R v Mgxwiti 1954 (l) SA 370 (A) as 
well asR v Dladla 1962 (1) SA 307 (A) as examples where causation was required. 
12 In S v Sa.fatsa supra (n 11) at 900G-H the court said that causation is not a requisite. 
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In this discussion I hope to look closely at the concept of 
association to determine the extent of participation required before the 
accused will be held criminally liable. This involves establishing the 
stage at which common purpose actually arises, as well as a discussion 
of related concepts including culpability. 13 The question which is 
seemingly difficult to resolve is whether all those who acted with a 
common purpose are accomplices or perpetrators. 14 It is submitted that 
participants in a common purpose cannot be accomplices or accessories 
after the fact unless it is established that they cannot be held liable under 
the common purpose doctrine despite their involvement in the criminal 
act. In such an event it would be necessary to show that the accused: 
(i) did not share a common purpose with his companion 
(ii) acted independently, and that 
(iii) no prior agreement or active association existed. 
It is causation which leads some thinkers to argue that, because 
the causal link is not required in cases where common purpose ts 
involved, some participants are accomplices and not perpetrators. 
It is respectfully submitted that courts at times have abused the 
doctrine and extended liability to include instances for which the doctrine 
was obviously never intended.15 From the above it is discernible that 
13 Causation is discussed in Chapter 3A infra. 
14 Implied in the views expressed by Snyman op cit (n3) at 256 is that people sharing a common purpose 
are perpetrators. He says "Thirdly if evidence reveals previous conspiracy between X and Z to kill Y, Z 
is guilty of murder .... " 
15 The case of S v lv'zo supra (n2) is a clear example where, in my view, irrelevant issues were allowed to 
determine the fate of the accused. This case will be discussed infra Chapter 2C. However, in S v 
Safatsa supra (n 11) correct inferences forming the basis for conviction of the Sharpville Six were drawn. 
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common purpose, through the doctrine of imputation, serves to fill the 
gap created by the absence of causation in circumstances in which more 
than one person was involved in the commission of the crime. It imputes 
the conduct of one person to another so that all persons sharing a 
common purpose with respect to a particular crime will not escape 
liability. 
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CHAPTER2 
ASSOCIATION 
A Definition of common purpose. 
It is the application, and not the definition, of common purpose that 
poses problems for the courts. In the English case of Afack/in, A1urphy and 
others16 Alderson J stated that ''it is the principle of law, that if several 
persons act together in pursuance of a c01mnon intent, every act done in 
furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by all." 17 
Burchell, 18 on the other hand states: 
"Where two or more people agree to commit a cnme or actively 
associate in a joint unlawful enterprise, each will be responsible for 
specific criminal conduct committed by one of their number which 
falls within their common design." 
The above definitions clearly show that common purpose liability is 
based on an imputation of the acts of all the participants to each other. 19 
Burchell states that common purpose has the two crucial elements of prior 
agreement between, or active association of, two or more persons. Implied 
in both agreement and active association directed at the unlawful conduct is 
the element of intention. However, it is my submission that where X and Z 
have agreed to murder Y, but X does not turn up at the scene of the crime, Z 
16 1838 2 Lewin 225, 168 ER 1136 1138. 
17 MA Rabie "The doctrine of common purpose in criminal law" 197 I SAL! 227. 
18 EM Burchell and PMA Hunt South African criminal law and Procedure Vol. l General Principles of 
Criminal Law 3 ed. by J.M. Burchell (1997) at 307. 
19 Courts have, however, not been consistent in the application of the doctrine. The court in S v .Vzo supra 
(n 2) seems to have given a wide meaning to the concept of imputation. 
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should be solely liable for the murder of Y should he go ahead and murder 
Y. Equally, where X and Z, pursuant to their agreement, both turn up at the 
scene but then X persuades Z to abandon the plan and in fact refuses to 
paiiicipate therein, but Z nevertheless goes ahead and kills Y, this act of 
dissociation by X should exculpate X from liability. In the first scenario X 
should be liable for incitement or complicity to murder although he was not 
present at the scene of the crime. This is so because of the prior agreement 
and his failure to actively dissociate himself. This would be the case even 
where X was the dominant partner but did not do anything positive to 
frustrate the plan to kill Y by, for example, restraining X or even informing 
the police. Something more positive than merely not turning up at the scene 
is required to demonstrate that X dissociated himself from the original plan 
to kill Y.20 
B. Agreement 
The basis of common purpose is prior agreement or active 
association.21 The agreement may be express or implied. Snyman22 has 
correctly pointed out that agreement is not the same as active association~ 
"it is merely one form of active association." Matzukis23 explains that 
express agreement involves articulated achievement of consensus ad 
idem24 between the parties that one or more of them should bring about the 
death of the deceased. Implied mandate, on the other hand, is achieved 
20 Hales points out that where the accused dissociated himself, he will not be liable for offences committed 
after his withdrawal, provided that his dissociation was effective. See Hales " 'Effective dissociation' 
from common purpose - a Zimbabwean view" 1982 SA CJ 187 188. 
21 See Snyman op cit (n 3) 252 and Burchell op cit (n 18) 317. 
2~ Snyman loc cit. 
23 NA Matzukis "The nature and scope of common purpose" 1988 ,S'.4 CJ 226 231. 
24 Matzukis loc cit. For a case where the death of Y fell within the mandate see S v Alajosi 1991 
(2) SACR 532 (A). 
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through conduct and the granting of authority by one person in a superior 
position to another. The tenn 'mandate' has been criticised, rightfully, 
because: 
(i) it is a concept that is applied in the law of contract and which 
therefore cannot be suited to criminal matters~ and 
(ii) implied mandate to commit a crime has no force or effect 
since it is contra bonos more5,J.5 
In S v Yelani26 it is not clear what the basis of liability was. The facts 
of the case are, briefly, as follows: The house of Mr and Mrs T was 
destroyed by fire allegedly caused by Y. A meeting was held by a group of 
people who conducted a "trial" at which accused no 6 presided. The trial 
court held accused no 6 guilty of murder and sentenced him to death, 
despite the exculpatory portion of the statement of accused no 6 to Toise, a 
witness 
"dat hy as 'n persoon wie die voorsittende beampte was in die saak, 
nie 'n besluit geneem het nie en as gevolg daarvan moes die saak 
uitgestel word. "27 
It is my respectful submission that accused no 6 in Ye/an; did not actively 
associate himself with the conduct of those who had attacked Y. This is so 
because accused no 6 was not present at the scene of the crime.28 In the 
absence of active association, the only reasonable inference is that liability 
was based on prior agreement or on implied mandate.29 
25 Snyman op cit (n 3) 251. 
26 1989 (2) SA 43 (A). 
2 ~ S v Yelani supra (n 26) at 50F. 
28 It has been stated in S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 686 (A) 7051- 706C that in the absence of prior 
agreement, an accused will only be liable under this doctrine if certain requirements arc met which are 
pointers to active association. One of these pointers is that he must be present at the scene of the crime. 
29 See the criticism of implied mandate by Snyman op cit (n 3) 251. 
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The court a lJUO apparently relied on implied mandate to convict the 
accused. This is clear from the statement: "if a person . . . passes or 
authorises what amounts to a sentence of death on another, with the 
subjective intention that the sentence will be carried out, he is liable for the 
ensuing death . . . irrespective of whether he was present at the scene or 
not. "30 Happily the sentence was overturned by the appellate division on 
the basis that the accused did not authorize or sentence the deceased to 
death as alleged. In other words there was neither prior agreement nor 
active association. 
The issue of agreement also has a bearing on the question as to when 
culpability is to be assessed. Is it at the time common purpose was 
formulated, or at the time of the commission of the crime? Jn S v Nkwenja31 
Jansen JA, Joubert JA and Grosskopf AJA were of the view that the correct 
moment for assessing fault was when the common purpose was 
fonnulated. 32 Assuming that accused no 6 in Yelani was guilty on the basis 
of common purpose, his liability would have been based on the assessment 
of culpability at the time the common purpose was formed. This, I submit, 
is the correct approach. This approach has been criticised as failing to take 
into account the subsequent change of mind. 33 This criticism is, with 
respect, unjustified. Any subsequent withdrawal would be indicative of 
dissociation from what was agreed to earlier. 
311 
relani (n 26) at 46F-G. AlsoR v lv]enje 1966 (1) SA 369 (RA) at 377B. 
31 1985 (2) SA 560 (A) at 572G-I. 
32 The opposite approach was followed in S v Afitchell and another 1992 (1) SACR 17 (A) 22G-H. 
See N Boister "Common purpose: Association and mandate" 1992 SAC.! 167 at 169. 
33 Burchell and Hunt supra ( n 18) at 314 suggest that assessment at the time common purpose was 
formulated involves a versari-type of liability. He is in full support of the dissenting minority 
view ofRabie CJ and Miller JA in Sv Nkwenja supra (n 31). He argues that "The majority judgement 
by not taking account of a subsequent change in the mental state of a participant in a common purpose 
before the completion of the crime, would involve a versari-type ofliability." 
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The trial court in S v Yelani seemingly assessed culpability at the time of 
the formulation of common purpose to murder, but unfortunately concluded 
that there was such agreement when in fact there never was one. If 
assessment of culpability is made at the moment of murder34 as opposed to 
the moment when the alleged common purpose to kill came into being, 35 
this would lead to unacceptable results at times. Where X, for example, 
agrees with Z that the latter must murder Y, but X is not to be present at the 
scene (this may be because Xis known to the would-be victim and wants to 
avoid possible identification) X would not escape liability. As soon as the 
commission of the crime reaches the "commencement of execution" stage, 
the prior agreement between X and Z should stand, and late withdrawal 
should not avail as a defence. The only advantage in the approach of 
assessment of culpability at the moment of murder is that those who 
dissociated themselves in time would escape liability. 
C. Active association 
It has been emphasised that active association is a wider concept than 
agreement. 36 However, at times active association may be the result of prior 
agreement. The converse is not also true. Active association may also exist 
where there was no prior agreement. Even where there was no prior 
agreement, the liability of the parties may be based on active association as 
evidenced by the conduct of the parties.37 
34 As was the case in S v Mitchell supra (n 32). 
35 As was the case in S v ]1/kwenja supra (n 31 ). 
36 Snyman op cit (n 3) at 252 correctly points out that agreement is merely one form of association. 
:n 
"Association in the common purpose leads to an imputation of the acts of all the participants to 
each other, and consequently renders the act of the principal offender the act of all." Sec W.A. 
Joubert ed. The Law of South Africa vol 6 (1996) at 125. In S v Safatsa (1988)(1) SA 868 (A) at 
895 it was held that a causal connection between the offender's act and the deceased's death is not required. 
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In S v Safatsa38 a mob had attacked and killed Y, and some six 
members of that mob were charged with murder. It was established that 
they were part of a mob which had attacked Y, and the appellate division 
was satisfied that they all shared a common purpose to kill even though 
there was no causal link between the individual act of each accused and the 
death ofY. 
Because the contribution of some of the accused was very limited and 
doubtful, this case has been subjected to strong but unjustified criticism. 39 
Botha JA pointed out that "all these accused had actively associated 
themselves with the conduct of the mob which was directed at the killing of 
the deceased. "40 This, I submit, was correct.41 
In S v Mgedezl42 it was stated that in the absence of prior agreement43 
an accused can be liable on the basis of common purpose only if certain 
pre-requisites exist. These pre-requisites are the following: 
(i) he must have been present at the scene where violence was 
committed 
(ii) he must have been aware of the assault 
38 Supra (n 37). 
39 See WW Duba "What was wrong with the Sharpeville Six decision" 1990 SACJ 180 and E 
Cameron "Inferential reasoning and extenuation in the case of the Sharpeville Six" 1988 .S:4 CJ 
243. Duba, however, correctly acknowledges that "the principles of the doctrine of common 
purpose were correctly set out but that their application to the facts of the case was, with respect, 
incorrect." 
40 S v Safatsa supra (n 37) at 893G-H. 
41 Unterhalter argues that common purpose derives from the exercise of each indi\-idual's will and 
not from transportation oftl1e collective will on each individual. See D Unterhalter "The doctrine 
of common purpose: what makes a person liable for the actions of another" 1988 S.4 CJ 671 676. 
42 1989 (1) SA 687 (A). 
43 Mare states, correctly, that the accused in S v Thomo 1969 (1) SA 385 (A) neither associated 
himself with the perpetrator's crime nor consciously shared with the perpetrator a common 
pmpose to kill the deceased. See MC Mare "The liability of the joiner-in for murder" 1990 SA CJ 25 38. 
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(iii) he must have intended to make common cause with those who 
actually perpetrated the assault 
(iv) he must have manifested his sharing of a common purpose by 
himself perfonning some act of association with the conduct of 
others 
(v) he must have had the requisite mens rea. 
While the Mgedezi formula44 is most welcome, it does not necessarily 
follow that compliance with those requirements will always lead to a verdict 
of guilty unless they are found to exist all at the same time. This is clear 
where, for example, X is a passive spectator.45 Manete, a witness in the 
Safatsa case, was present at the scene of the crime, but was not for that 
reason held to have actively associated himself with the accused. 46 While 
presence at the scene of the crime will not necessarily lead to liability, it is 
equally true that absence at the scene of the crime, where there was a prior 
agreement, will not save the accused from conviction.47 The qui facit nile48 
ensures that a person who procures another to commit the crime will not 
escape conviction on the basis that he was not present at the scene. He may 
be held responsible as ifhe committed the crime himself. 
44 Mgedezi supra (n 42) at 705G-706B. Criterion (iv) implies that a passive spectator cannot be guilty 
since he does not share in the common purpose to commit the crime. 
45 In S v Memani 1990 (2) SA 4 (Tk) 8 it was held that the mere fact of presence where there was no act of 
association is insufficient for liability. 
46 See Sv Safatsa op cit (n 38) at 872B-D. 
47 This explains why in S v Yelani supra (n 26) accused no 6 was held liable by the court a quo 
although he was never present neither at the second meeting nor at the scene of the crime. 
48 This rule essentially means that he who commits the crime through another commits it himself. 
"Quifacit per a/iumfacit per se." This maxim was obviously applied by the trail court in S v Yelani 
supra (n 26). 
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A case which seems to have puzzled most writers, and which was 
justly criticized, is that of S v Nzo. 49 In this case the actual perpetrator fled to 
Lesotho and was never brought to justice. Instead, two people who were not 
at the scene of the crime and who, according to the evidence, were not even 
aware that Y was to be killed, were nevertheless convicted by the court a 
quo under the common purpose doctrine. 50 The appellate division correctly 
accepted that the appellants could not be found guilty as co-perpetrators 
since neither of them had taken part in the killing of Y. There was no 
evidence of a common purpose among the appellants to kill the deceased. 
There was no prior agreement, mandate of any kind or active association 
with respect to the specific crime of killing Mrs T. The immediate question 
that comes to mind is: why were they then convicted by the trial court? Why 
was the appellate division prepared to allow the appeal in the case of the first 
appellant, and confirm the conviction of murder in the case of the second 
appellant? The trial court clearly accepted that the accused had actively 
associated themselves with the commission of the crime. On appeal it was 
held that the first appellant, who was the leader of the ANC51 cell in Port 
Elizabeth, had subsequently effectively dissociated himself. The evidence, 
however, did not indicate an existence of any prior agreement or active 
association with respect to murder by either appellant. What is it, then, that 
first appellant dissociated himself from? 
49 1990 (3) SA l(A). Also see J Burchell "Criminal Law: Strafreg" 1990 SAC! 345 at 348 where he 
points out that "in this case there was no prior agreement to kill the deceased ... in the absence of 
prior agreement, presence at the scene was required for the common purpose principle of 
imputing the acts of the perpetrator to the other parties to a common purpose." 
50 This case has been severely criticised by almost all writers. See Duba op cit (n 39). See also 
Burchell (n 52) infra where he points out that there was no manifestation of a sharing of a 
common purpose with the perpetrator of murder by performing "some act of association with the 
conduct of the murder." 
51 The African National Congress will always be referred to as the ANC in the discussion to follow. 
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The court, in a decision which, it is submitted, is clearly wrong, 
concluded that there was "common purpose on the part of the accused to 
commit acts of sabotage and that fatalities must have been foreseen and, by 
inference, were foreseen by the participants"52 This decision is unfortunate 
and, looked at from any perspective, simply leads to untenable results. It is 
nothing but the application of the versari doctrine. 53 Since both appellants 
were held liable by the court a quo on the basis of common purpose, the 
appellate division equally misdirected itself in allowing the appeal in respect 
of the first appellant on the grounds that he had subsequently dissociated 
himself. His dissociation was, in my opinion, neither genuine nor voluntary. 
He decided to "talk" because he had been discovered. He conveniently 
tendered infonnation to protect himself from possible assault by the police. 
If he was aware of the roadblock ahead, he would have alighted from the 
vehicle earlier, to avoid detection. His contact with the police is not what he 
\vanted. Given the opportunity, the appellant would have avoided arrest. His 
dissociation is questionable, considering that at the very moment of arrest he 
was on an illegal mission to Lesotho. His dissociation was nothing but 
cowardly capitulation especially considering that: 
(i) he was the leader of the A.~C cell in Port Elizabeth, and 
(ii) it was a late withdrawal at a stage when the life of l\.1rs T 
could not be saved. 54 
52 See Burchell "S v Nzo I 990 (3) SA 1 (A). Common purpose liability" 1990 S.1 CJ 345 at 346. 
53 r 7ersari in re illicita omnia imputantur quae ex delicto sequuntur - it means that whoever 
indulges in unla\vful conduct has to bear the consequences of all hann ensuing from his 
wrongdoing, even if those consequences are unintended 
54 A leader, to effectively dissociate himself, must do something more positive, e.g. notify the 
police. See Hales "Effective dissociation from a common purpose - a Zimbabwean view" 1992 
.~'.4 ('J 187. Appellant's reporting to the police was both involuntary and too late to he useful 
in saving Mrs T. His last minute withdrawal should not have saved him at all. 
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In any event, the question of dissociation does not arise at all here 
because both appellants never actively associated themselves in the first 
place. There was also never a prior agreement with Joe (the perpetrator) that 
Mrs T should be killed. One appellant was, admittedly, aware that a threat 
to kill Mrs T had been made by Joe. This surely does not amount to 
agreement. It is submitted that both appellants should have been found not 
guilty of the crime of murder. Their membership of the ANC had only 
indirect bearing on the crime of murder. Alternatively, they should both 
have been convicted. It is incorrect that the court could have allowed the 
appeal of one appellant on the basis of dissociation. 
Steyn JA, in a compelling dissenting judgement, rightly argued that 
neither of the appellants was guilty of murder since 
"die bestaan van die bree algemene, of oorkoepelende gemeenskaplike 
doel om sabotasie in die Port Elizabeth gebied te pleeg is, na my 
oordeel, nie genoegsaam om appellant sonder meer regtens 
aanspreeklik te hou in die moord op die oorledene nie. 55 
They had not agreed to murder the deceased and had not done 
anything to help the perpetrator. 56 He explained that the common purpose 
doctrine had in English law application to a small group of persons and was 
based on the principle of proximity of the participant to the commission of 
the crime. 57 
55 S v Nzo supra (n 49) at 12C-17F. See also Burchell and Hunt op cit (n 18) at 310 where Burchell 
expresses full agreement with the dissenting judgement of J A Steyn. 
56 JA Steyn's reasoning suggests that he would have held accused no 6 in S v Yelani supra (n 26) 
not guilty. 
57 The principle of proximity is important as it limits liability and confines the doctrine within 
manageable bounds. This principle is discussed in Chapter 5 infra. 
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S v 1\1i!chell~s is another example of a case in which the doctrine was, 
with respect, incorrectly applied. The accused, X and Z, stopped at a cafe. 
An agreement \vas reached that they would collect stones which they would 
throw at pedestrians from the back of their vehicle when their joun1ey had 
resumed. They collected stones in pursuance of this objective, including a 
paving-brick which X also collected. The stone-throwing resulted in the 
death of a pedestrian. The agreement between X and Z involved the 
collecting and throwing of stones, and this did not include the throwing of 
paving bricks, so the trial court argued. 
My own interpretation of the above agreement is that in it is included 
the agreement to collect and throw anything capable of being thrown 
including oranges, stones, paving bricks and even the remnants of what they 
were eating. This latter approach accords with the approach adopted by the 
court a quo. It found Z guilty of murder. Z successfully appealed against 
this conviction. 
The appellate division found that Z was incorrectly convicted of 
murder; he had not agreed to the throwing of paving bricks. Their common 
purpose was limited to the throwing of stones. It is submitted that this literal 
interpretation is unusual and fails completely if the Mgedezi formula were to 
be applied. On the Mgedezi formula Z should have been convicted of 
murder if there was prior agreement to attack pedestrians or, in the absence 
of such agreement, if Z actively associated himself with the commission of 
the crime on the basis that (i) he was present at the scene of the crime; (ii) he 
was aware that X had picked a paving brick in pursuance of their agreement 
to throw stones at pedestrians, (iii) he intended to make common cause with 
58 1992 (1) SACR 17 (A). 
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X, the perpetrator; (iv) he manifested his sharing of common purpose by 
himself perfonning some act of association with the conduct of X; and ( v) he 
had the necessary mens rea. 59 
It is submitted that all these requisites were present, and that Z did 
foresee the possibility that the throwing of projectiles at persons might have 
fatal consequences, but reconciled himself to this possibility. He had do/us 
eventualis. There is nothing to indicate that Z dissuaded, or attempted to 
dissuade X against picking up or using a paving brick (as opposed to using a 
stone). The argument of Nestadt JA that there was no common purpose 
because of the marked difference in size between the stones collected and 
the brick that was thrown does not hold. A stone can be bigger in size than a 
paving brick. The argument that the agreement to collect and throw stones 
necessarily excludes the picking of a paving brick is not convmcmg, 
especially because the agreement as to the size of material to be collected 
was never canvassed. Boister60 argues that there was no intention by Z to 
kill: 
"It was not enough that Z had to foresee the use of the brick and the 
resulting death. He did not and thus was not liable. Without the 
requisite intention to kill there could be no imputation." 
The second premise in Boister's statement is questionable. I 
respectfully submit that Z did foresee that the use of a paving brick might 
result in death. His intention to kill was in the form of do/us eventualis. It is 
59 See 1989 (l) SA 687 (A) at 705G - 706C. 
60 N Boister "Common purpose: association and mandate" 1992SALJ167 168 where he says that" ... the 
form of common purpose specified in Mgedezi as the mandate situation, did not extend to throwing of 
the brick and thus the conscious decision to participate in the throwing of stones could not be the basis 
for imputing X's actions to those party to the original agreement." 
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not necessary that the requisite intention should be in the form of do/us 
directus where there is a common purpose. 61 All that Z lacked was do/us 
directus, but he had do/us eventualis. In S v Nkwenja62 Jansen JA, Joubert 
JA and Grosskopf AJA shared the view that "the critical moment for 
assessing the mens rea of a participant in a common purpose was when the 
common purpose was formulated." 
Rabie CJ and Miller JA in the Nkwenja case were of the opinion that 
the critical moment for assessing mens rea was when the unlawful conduct 
of the actual perpetrator was committed.63 Burchell64 argues that "the 
majority judgement, by not taking account of subsequent change in the 
mental state of a participant in a common purpose before the completion of 
the crime, would involve versari- type liability." 
This conclusion cannot be supported.65 If Z's mens rea is assessed at 
the time of formulation, he did have intention. As explained earlier,66 the 
prior agreement in S v Mitchel/67 was about ''the collecting and the throwing" 
of stones at pedestrians and here I am in full agreement with what was said 
in R v Shezi and others, 68 namely that "the liability of parties to a common 
purpose depends on whether the result produced by the perpetrator of the act 
falls within the mandate and is not concerned with the means by which the 
result is produced." 
61 Do/us eventualis may suffice. See Burchell op cit (n 18) 313. 
62 Supra (n 31) at 572G-I. 
63 1Vkwenja 1985 (2) SA 560 (A) at 572G-I. 
64 Op cit (n 18) at 314. 
65 The reason for rejecting the minority view will be discussed in Chapter 3B i1?fra. 
66 See discussion in text starting opposite note 57 supra. 
67 Supra (n 58). 
68 1948 (2) SA 119 (A) at 128. 
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Nestadt JA in S r A1itchell-'') ignored the mandate referred to above, 
and paid undue attention to the means. As pointed out above the agreement 
of collecting and of throwing stones cannot exclude the collection and 
throwing of other throwable objects including oranges, stones, bricks and 
even remnants of the food they had bought at the cafe. Besides mandate and 
prior agreement, there was also association, which is evidenced by 
participation in stone throwing. On the Shezi formula the means are 
irrelevant. 
Active association will, therefore, always exist where there was 
conduct which can be described in terms of the formula in S v A1gedezi. 70 
Burchell71 submitted that in the light of the unfortunate decision in S v Nzo72 
"Continued membership of an organisation which adheres to the 
policy that violence is pennissible in order to achieve certain political 
ends will not only expose its members to prosecution and conviction 
for treason but also for murder, in tenns of the common purpose 
principle, if a killing is perpetrated by one of its members in 
furtherance of the objectives of the organisation.'' 73 
69 Supra (n 58) .. 
70 Afgedezi supra (n 59) at 705G-706B. 
71 Burchell op cit (n 18) at 317. 
72 Nzo supra (n 49). 
73 See Burchell supra (n 18). The same statement is repeated in Burchell op cit (n 52) at 349. It 
is submitted that this view cannot be supported because. firstly, it does not form part of our law 
and, secondly it militates against the spirit of tolerance and reconciliation in the new South Africa. 
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CHAPTER3 
CAl!SATION AND CULPABILITY 
In materially defined cnmes, such as murder, the accused will be 
liable only where his conduct is causally linked to the forbidden 
consequence. 7-1 X will be liable for murder only where his attack caused the 
death of Y. Where X attacked Y but Y did not die, X cannot be convicted 
for murder75 because X's conduct did not cause the alleged consequence, 
namely death. In all result crimes the courts must be satisfied with the 
existence of causation before they will hold the accused liable. Furthermore, 
even if the accused did cause the d~ath of Y, he will not be liable unless his 
conduct is blameworthy or culpable as well. This explains why a toddler or 
the mentally ill person may at times escape liability. It is because of their 
criminal incapacity and the fact that they are incapable of intending, in the 
legal sense, the consequences of their acts, that such persons are not 
criminally responsible for the consequences of their acts. 
A Causation 
Although it is now settled law that causation 1s not required for 
common purpose liability,76 the courts have in the past failed to address the 
question whether or not the causal link between conduct and consequence is 
required. 77 
74 For a clear discussion of causation see Snyman op cit (n 3) 69-87. 
75 He might. however. be charged with assault or attempted murder. 
06 See Sv Safasta 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) at 897A-B. Botha JA's conclusion that causation was not 
required was based on the formulation by Holmes JA in Sv .\fad/ala 1969 (2) SA 637 (A) at 640F-H. 
77 For cases where there was a conviction '~ithout proof of causation. see R 1· .\Jgxwiti 1954 (I) SA 
370 (A): R l' Dladla and others 1962 (1) SA 307 (A) and .s· 1· .\falinga 1963 (I) SA 692 (A). 
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In R v Sikepe 78 the court was satisfied that, although it was not clear 
who had strangled the deceased, the accused shared a common purpose to 
murder. They had all been present at the scene of the crime. There was also 
a possibility that some among the accused had not even entered the house, 
but had kept guard. There was therefore active association. The court did 
not require proof of a causal link between the act of strangling and the 
resultant death, or to identify the actual strangler, but convicted them of 
murder in terms of the common purpose doctrine. 
Snyman 79 correctly points out that "in a charge of having committed a 
crime which involves the causing of a certain result (such as murder) the 
conduct imputed includes the causing of such result." If it is established that 
the accused all agreed to commit a crime or actively associated themselves 
with the commission of the crime by one of their members and each had the 
requisite mens rea, then the act of the member who actually causes the 
consequence is imputed to the other perpetrators. In S v Malinga80 Holmes 
JA said the following: "Hence, as far as individual mens rea is concerned, 
the shot fired by accused no 4 was, in effect, also the shot of each of the 
appellants." The common purpose doctrine was introduced apparently for 
the very purpose of by-passing causation by allowing imputation to fill the 
gap left by this concept. The courts cannot allow parties to escape liability 
78 1946 AD 745. 
79 Op cit (n 3) at 249. 
80 Supra (n 9) at 695A-B. 
21 
simply on the ground that it cannot be determined which of the many 
persons sharing a common purpose actually inflicted the fatal wound. If it 
can be shown that all the parties to a common purpose individually had mens 
rea in respect of the result, and that there was prior agreement or active 
association, then all will become liable even if no causal link between the act 
and the consequences is established. This is well put in LAWSA81 where it 
is stated: 
"It is a mechanism which the courts apply to offences reqmnng 
intention, where, upon proof of the required intention, all the 
participants in the common purpose are found guilty, without it being 
necessary to prove that each participant committed the act which 
constitutes the offence, 82 or even that he was present at the scene of 
the crime. 83 Association to a common purpose leads to an imputation 
of the acts of all the participants to each other, and consequently 
renders the act of the principal offender the act of all the others. 84 The 
result caused by one is imputed to others as well." 
In the pre-Safatsa case of S v Thomo85 Steyn CJ required that on a 
charge of murder it was necessary to prove that the accused· was guilty of 
unlawful conduct which caused or contributed causally to the death of the 
deceased. Although Steyn CJ was a party to decisions both in S v Thomo86 
81 Op cit (n 37) at 125. 
82 s 
ee R v Mashotonga 1962 (2) SA 321 (SR) 327E-F. 83 See Nhiri v S 1976 (1) H104 (RA). 
84 
In S v Safatsa supra (n 37) at 897 A-Bit was held that there does not have to be a causal 
conne~on between ~ offender's conduct and the cause of death where common pmpose exists. The 
same VIew was held mSv ,~enja 1985 (2) SA 560 (A) andSv Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A). 85 1969 (1) SA 385 (A) at 399B-E. 
86 Supra (n 85). 
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and S v A1adiaia81 , he concurred in the judgement of the latter case although 
no reference was made to causation. It has to be noted, as Mare88 points out, 
that the case of Thomo89 in fact dealt with the situation of a joiner-in 
involved in an independent venture for which common purpose was not 
l d R b. 90 d required, and for which causation had to be establis 1e . a 1e an 
Matzukis91 share the view set out in S v Safatsa92 that in a common purpose 
situation a causal link need not be proved, and that active association is 
sufficient to render the accused criminally liable. 
It is submitted that causation that is imputed is based upon the concept 
of active association. The question of causation will hopefully not arise 
again because, as Snyman puts it, "the conduct imputed includes the causing 
of such result. "93 Common purpose would loose its meaning if causation 
had to be proved. It must be imputed to the accused who shared a common 
' purpose with the actual perpetrator because of his active association in the 
criminal conduct. 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
1969 (2) SA 637 (A). 
MC Mare "The liability of the joiner-in for murder" 1990 S'.4CJ24 25. 
Supra (n 85). Botha AJA pointed out in S v Khoza supra (n 84) that the dictum relating to the liability 
of the joiner-in had been obiter. 
MA Rabie "Kousaliteit en 'common purpose' by moord" 1988 SAS 234. 
NA Matzukis "The nature and scope of common purpose" 1988 SACJ 226 227. 
Supra (n 76). 
Snyman op cit (n 3) 250. The value of the doctrine lies in the fact that whenever a group of 
people, intending a particular consequence, eg the death of Y, act together in order to achieve their 
goal, the prosecution is relieved of having to prove whose blow actually caused the death of Y. If the 
causal link had to be established, all members of the group sharing a common purpose might 
escape liability because the causal link between each member's act and Y's death cannot be proved. 
23 
B Culpa bilitv or fault 
An accused will be liable only for acts for which he can be blamed. 
There can be no liability without fault. 94 Fault will be in the form of 
intention or negligence. 
Where the basis of liability is intention (as opposed to negligence) 
such intention will be in the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus or do/us 
eventualis. If the accused means to do the prohibited act or to bring about the 
prohibited result, the accused has dolus directus because it was his aim and 
object to do the unlawful act or to bring about the consequence. 
Dolus eventualis, on the other hand, exists where the accused does not 
mean to bring about the unlawful circumstance, or to cause the unlawful 
consequence, but foresees the possibility of the circumstance existing or the 
consequence resulting but nevertheless proceeds with his conduct.95 Dolus 
eventualis would exist where, for example, X intends to kill Z but the bullet 
misses Z and hits Y. If Y in fact dies from the shot fired by X, in law X 
does intend Y's death if he did foresee the death of Y as a possible result of 
shooting Zand reconciled himself to this possibility. 
In a common purpose situation dolus eventualis may exist where X 
and Z agree to commit robbery. If X is not aware that Z is carrying a gun, X 
will not be liable for murdering Y. If he was aware of this fact, he will not 
94 
95 
This principle is expressed in the maxim actus nonfacit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Snyman op cit 
(n 3) at 131 for good reasons prefers the term 'culpability' to 'mens rea.' 
For an ex'J)Osition of the various forms of intention see Burchell op cit (n 18) 222-240 and Snyman 
supra (n 3) at 168-174. 
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be guilty of murder if the agreement to rob did not include the possible use 
of the gun under any circumstances, and the death of Y is a result of an 
independent act of Z for which no express or implied agreement between X 
and Z existed. 
This clearly demonstrates that X will only be liable if he foresaw the 
possibility that "the act of the participants with whom he associates himself 
may result in Y's death and reconciles himself to this possibility."96 
Imputation on the basis of common purpose is, therefore, limited to 
causation and does not extend to culpability. Writers97 generally agree that 
the culpability of each party has to be determined individually. Rabie98 
states that the liability of a party to a common purpose is not vicarious, and 
that "it accordingly does not follow that where a common purpose has been 
established, the same intent must be imputed to all who take part in its 
execution. "99 
A person who is present at the scene of the cnme will not be 
criminally liable if he seemingly actively associated himself with the 
commission of the crime but in fact lacked the necessary culpability. A 
person may be present at the scene in order to gather evidence or to facilitate 
identification of the actors or even to gather news as a reporter. In S v 
Magwaza100 the court was of the view that the appellant knew that his 
companion was in possession of a firearm which he might use in the 
96 
97 
See Snyman op cit (n 3) at 253. 
Eg Snyman loc cit. 
98 In LA WSA op cit (n 37) at 132. 
99 Snyman supra (n 96) states that the liability of an associate in a common purpose to 
commit an unlawful act depends upon his own culpability. Also see S v Memani 1990 (2) SACR 
4(TkA)7B. 
100 1985 (3) SA 29 (A) at 41B. 
25 
execution of the robbery. However, the court was not convinced that the 
appellant "knew as a fact" that his companion's fireann was loaded. This 
approach is conect. The subjective test of intention should lead to liability 
only where X subjectively foresaw that the gun might be used with fatal 
results. "Knowing as a fact" alluded to in the above case is, in my opinion, 
nothing other than a requirement of do/us directus. However, in most 
instances do/us eventualis would suffice. The test for culpability does not 
apply differently when common purpose is involved. Burchell conectly 
states that there is "nothing special about common purpose liability in this 
regard. "101 
The only point of argument with regard to culpability is the conect 
moment for assessing fault, 102 and whether a party to a common purpose can 
be found guilty of culpable homicide. It cannot be denied that where X and 
Z assault Y with no intention to kill, the accused will not be liable for 
murder if Y dies. This is so because, firstly, they had no common purpose to 
kill Y and, secondly, they might only be negligent with respect to the death 
of Y. In such a case they may be liable for culpable homicide. 103 It should 
always be clear that each person's culpability is determined independently. 
It is causation, and not culpability, that will be imputed to the accused. It is 
"the perpetrators' act of causing the death" 104 that will be attributed to the 
other members in terms of the doctrine of common purpose. 
101 See Burchell op cit (n 18) at 313. However, he does comment that "there is a good deal of 
practical common sense in confining the common purpose principle to cases where do/us directus 
is present." 
102 See discussion in Burchell supra at 314. 
103 Snyman op cit (n 3) at 254 and Burchell loc cit both accept that the negligent causing of death 
may lead to a conviction for culpable homicide. 
104 See Snyman op cit (n 3) at 254. 
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The majority of the court in S v Nkwenja105 held that the critical 
moment for assessing the mens rea of a participant in a common purpose is 
when the common purpose is formulated, and not when the unlawful act is 
committed. Rabie CJ and Miller JA, on the other hand, were of the view 
that mens rea should be assessed at the moment of the actual commission of 
the unlawful act. Burchell 106 supports the minority judgement. His 
argument is essentially that if culpability is assessed at the formulation stage, 
any subsequent change of mind is not accommodated in the court's minority 
view. This minority view, with respect, cannot be supported. Assessment at 
the formulation stage does not ignore the subsequent change of mind. 
Where X subsequently decides on the abandonment of his unlawful 
conduct, such withdrawal will mean that he no longer can be liable because, 
after all, as a result of the change of mind he will not have committed the 
cnme. Subsequent change of mind may be dissociation before the 
"commencement of execution" is reached, for which an accused cannot be 
liable. 
C The joiner-in 
Where X, acting independently and with intent to kill, 107 joins in an 
attack by Z on Y after Z has inflicted a fatal wound but while Y is still alive, 
X will be described as a joiner-in. The joiner-in situation only arises where 
the wound inflicted by X does not hasten the death of Y in any way. 108 
105 1985 (2) SA 560 (A). 
106 Op cit ( n 18) at 314. 
107 Mare op cit (n 43) 24 describes the joiner-in as referring to somebody who, with intent to kill, 
joins a murderous attack after the victim has already been mortally wounded but while he is still 
alive and whose conduct does not causally contribute to the victim's death. 
108 See discussion in Snyman op cit (n 3) 256-7 and in Burchell op cit (n 18) at 321-2. Where X's 
attack in fact hastens Y's death, X will be guilty of murder. 
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Although X has no previous agreement with Z to attack Y, X shares a 
common purpose based on active association if he joins before the fatal blow 
has been inflicted but by his own act hastens Y's death. In this latter 
situation he is not a joiner-in but becomes liable as the perpetrator in his own 
right. From the above it can be concluded that Z only becomes a joiner-in if 
he: 
(i) joins in the attack after the fatal wound has been inflicted, and 
(ii) does not hasten Y's death, and 
(iii) does not share a common purpose with Z to kill Y. 
In other words, X must be acting independently of Z. 
The question that was not settled until the decision in S v Motaung109 
was whether the joiner-in is liable as an accomplice 110 or as a perpetrator. It 
is argued by Whiting111 that there can be no accomplice liability to murder 
because it is conceptually impossible to further the commission of the crime 
without at the same time causing or contributing to the death of the 
deceased. In S v Mgxwiti112 Schrenier JA was of the view that even the 
joiner-in should be guilty of murder when he stated that 
"But where an accused person has joined a murderous assault upon 
one who is then alive but who dies as a result of the assault, it seems 
to me that no good reason exists why the accused should be guilty of 
murder if at the time he joined in the assault the victim, though 
perhaps grievously hurt, was not yet mortally injured, but should not 
109 1990 (4) SA 485 (A). 
110 In S v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A) at 1054 Botha AJA said that where the accused joins after the fatal 
wound has been inflicted, but while the victim is still alive, he is an accomplice. This view is no 
longer accepted as it is not possible to be an accomplice to murder. See Snyman op cit (n 3) at 261. 
111 
"Joining in" 1986 SALJ38 at 54. See also MC Mare "The liability of the Joiner-in for Murder" 1990 
SACJ24. 
112 1954 (1) SA 370 (A).382D-E. 
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be guilty if the injuries already received at the time can properly be 
described as mortal or fatal." 
This approach is obviously incorrect. Both Khoza, 113 in which a 
joiner-in was regarded as an accomplice, and Mgxwiti, 114 where a joiner-in 
was regarded as perpetrator, have now been rejected by the court in S v 
Motaung. 115 Liability based on common purpose will always arise where 
there was a prior agreement or active association. Common purpose does 
not presuppose the presence of a joiner-in. 116 
Concerning the question of which cnme a Jomer-in must be 
convicted was finally settled in S v Motaung, 117 in which it was held that a 
joiner-in after the fatal wound has been inflicted should be liable for 
attempted murder, while the person who joins the attack before the mortal 
wound has been inflicted should be convicted of murder. It is the latter 
situation which calls for the application of the common purpose doctrine 
because in this case, even in the absence of prior agreement, active 
association while the victim was still alive can be proved. If the victim was 
already mortally wounded when X joined, X, being the joiner-in, will be 
convicted of attempted murder because he perpetrated the crime when the 
victim could no longer be murdered. This would be no different from an 
113 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A). 
114 1954 (1) SA 370 (A). 
115 Supra (n 109). 
116 See Snyman op cit (n 3) 256. He says that. "first if the injuries inflicted by Zin fact hastened Y's 
death, there can be no doubt that there is a causal connection between Z's acts and Y's death and 
that Z is therefore guilty of murder. Secondly, if Z's assault on Y takes place after Y has already 
died from the injuries inflicted by X or his associates, X cannot be convicted of murder." 
117 Motaung supra (n 109) at 520F-G. Also see N Boister "Joining in is clearly less than murder" 
1991S:4CJ378. 
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attempt to commit the impossible because legally murder is limited to the 
killing of a human being and cannot extend to "the killing" of a corpse. 
Where prior agreement existed or, as Snyman puts it, 118 "the evidence 
reveals a previous conspiracy between X and Z to kill Y," there clearly 
exists a common purpose. It becomes irrelevant at what stage X "joined in." 
He should be liable for murder since he is not a joiner-in. 
118 Snyman op cit (n 3) at 256. 
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CHAPTER4 
DISSOCIATION 
Where X and Z had a common purpose to commit a particular crime, 
and X subsequently decides against continuation with the criminal conduct, 
the latter may be said to have dissociated himself. Dissociation is nothing 
other than voluntary withdrawal. Whether X had dissociated himself is a 
question of fact to be detennined in the light of surrounding circumstances. 
Snyman correctly points out that "it is however, not any kind of withdrawal 
which has this effect." 119 This essentially means that under certain 
circumstances the accused may be liable although he did dissociate himself 
from the common purpose. 
Hales 120 points out that where the accused dissociated himself he will 
not be liable for offences committed after his withdrawal, provided that "his 
dissociation was effective." There can be no dissociation if there never was 
prior agreement or active association. It will be the level of participation 
which will determine the degree required for one's effective dissociation. 121 
In the same way that association must be active and effective, it is equally 
necessary that the person who dissociates himself should, if he wants to 
escape liability, actively and effectively dissociate himself. 
It is the concept "effective dissociation" that courts find difficult to 
119 Snyman op cit (n 3) 254. The same principles that apply to voluntary withdrawal with respect 
to attempt apply equally here. 
120 L Hales " 'Effective dissociation' from common purpose - a Zimbabwean view" 1982 .S'.4 CJ 187 188. 
121 SK Parmanand "Dissociation in common purpose-a view from Venda" 1992S4CJ180 183 
states: "Dissociation, depending on the facts. will always be a question of degree." 
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define further. The following questions are pertinent: 
(i) does a mere subsequent change of one's mind suffice? 
(ii) is mere running away from the scene sufficient? 
(iii) would a person who dissociates himself, but does not leave 
the scene, be deemed not to have dissociated himself? 
(iv) must dissociation be express or implied?122 
(v) at what stage must one dissociate oneself in order to escape 
conviction? 
Snyman 123 has pointed out that to escape liability on the ground of 
withdrawal, (i) X must have a clear and unambiguous intention to withdraw 
from the common purpose; (ii) X must perform a positive act of 
withdrawal; 124 (iii) the withdrawal must be voluntary; (iv) the withdrawal 
must take place before events have reached what may be called the 
"commencement of the execution"; and (v) the type of act required for an 
effective withdrawal depends upon the circumstances. It is submitted that 
the last point summaries the requirements for withdrawal. What amounts to 
withdrawal in one case will not be so in another, as the cases that will be 
discussed, show. 
In S v Ndebu125 two appellants went at night with the intention of 
committing housebreaking. One appellant, X, had a gun, a fact of which Z, 
122 (ii) to (iv) are cited from DR Khuluse "Dissociation from common purpose-a survey" 1992 
SACJ 173. (i) is cited from Hales op cit (n 120) 188. 
123 Snyman op cit (n 3) 254. 
124 This view is also ex-pressed by DR Khuluse op cit (n 122) at 179. Courts seem to ex-perience 
problems in determining, in particular, what Snyman refers to as "commencement of execution." 
125 1986 (2) SA 133 (ZSC). 
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the other appellant, was fully aware. Z knew that the possibility of the gun 
being used existed and did not care whether fatal consequences ensued or 
not. As they entered the house, a woman saw them and screamed to a man 
who was in the room. The man approached X and he was shot and killed. 
The second appellant's evidence was that he fled as soon as the woman had 
screamed and was outside the gate when the fatal shot was fired. The 
question to be answered was whether this last minute withdrawal amounted 
to effective dissociation. The court concluded that his last minute flight from 
the scene did not amount to dissociation. McNally JA stated as follows: 
"On the facts of this case it will be apparent that the second 
appellant subjectively foresaw the possibility of the killing ... his 
flight neither averted the danger nor purged the recklessness. I 
have no doubt that in such circumstances mere flight was not 
dissociation, any more than hiding under the bed would have 
been." 126 
The court went on to state that he should have taken a positive step and 
dissuaded his companion. McNally JA127 further stated that a last minute 
withdrawal could operate as a mitigating factor, but that on its own it could 
not exculpate the accused. 
In R v Chinyerere128 a contrary view was taken. The court held that 
the man who ran away because he allegedly got scared while the group was 
attempting to break into a store, having not taken part in the theft which 
followed, had dissociated himself before the intended crime of theft was 
126 Sv Ndebu supra at 1370-H. 
127 Loe cit. 
128 1980 (2) SA 576 (RA). 
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committed. In the language of Snyman, the accused withdrew "before the 
course of events [had] reached what may be called the 'commencement of 
execution', ... a stage when it is no longer possible to desist or frustrate the 
commission of the crime." 129 This decision can be distinguished from the 
previous decision in that in the Chinyerere case the accused withdrew before 
the commission of the crime, while in Ndebu he dissociated himself at a 
stage when his dissociation could no longer influence the events at all. 
The above discussion indicates that flight from the scene will not 
always necessarily amount to dissociation. It will amount to dissociation 
only where it can be described as active or effective. Of relevance is also 
the role of the accused. Where he is the dominant member, an instigator or a 
man of influence, the court would hold him liable if he merely ran away 
from the scene without taking any positive steps to dissuade the others from 
carrying on with a plan in which he played a major role when it was 
formulated. However, a junior member of the group may, depending on the 
circumstances, not be liable and in his case running away may amount to 
effective withdrawal. 130 
The role played by the accused up to the stage of dissociation is 
clearly explained in S v Singo. 131 X had been part of a mob that had 
attacked an old woman whom they believed had bewitched a young girl. 
After having thrown stones, X was himself injured, and consequently 
129 Op cit (n 3) at 254. See also Hales op cit (n 120) at 187. 
130 In S v Xomakhlala 1990 (1) SACR 300 (A) at 304A-D, discussed infra. it was held tliat a person 
who played an inferior role in the planning may easily escape liability. The same view is 
e:\.-pressed in Sv Nduli 1993 (2) SACR 501 (A) at 504. 
131 1993 (1) SACR 226 (A). This case is also discussed by SK Pannanand in "Dissociation from 
common purpose-a view from Venda" 1992 .S'.4CJ 180. Also L Hales supra (n 120) at 188. 
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decided to leave the scene in order to go home. X was, along with seven 
other young men, convicted of murder. The question on appeal was whether 
X had effectively dissociated himself when he had initially played an active 
role in the initial assault when, after being struck by a stick, he retired to go 
to sleep. The appellate division held that X had effectively dissociated 
himself by leaving the scene of the crime and abandoning his intention to 
kill. 132 In this case common purpose was based upon active association and 
not upon prior agreement. 
In S v Nomakhlala133 X and Z, who were convicted of murder, were 
members of a group who had stopped Y's motor car and had driven Y to a 
rugby field where he was killed. X had been instructed to stab Y with a 
knife, but he refused to do so and immediately withdrew from the scene of 
the crime. X and Z appealed against their convictions of murder. 
Grosskopf JA, 134 in his judgement, pointed out that X "by refusing to stab 
the deceased, clearly indicated that he wanted no part in the attack of the 
deceased." His appeal against conviction was upheld. 
It could be argued that he should not only have refused to comply, but 
also have attempted to dissuade his companions. However, this argument 
fails when we consider the fact that the appellant was not a "comrade", did 
not share in their political thinking and his influence was obviously minimal. 
Grosskopf JA in Singo 135 correctly pointed out that S v Nomakhlala was not 
132 At 232E Grosskopf JA pointed out that "if the appellant had effectively dissociated himself from 
the common purpose prior to the infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he could not be 
convicted of her murder." 
133 Supra (n 130). 
134 Supra at 304 C. 
135 Supra (n 131) at 233F-G. 
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really a case of dissociation from a common purpose, because X had never 
associated himself with a common purpose to kill Y. His dissociation from 
the action of the murderers served to demonstrate his lack of association 
with the common purpose rather than to constitute dissociation therefrom. 
In S v Nzo 136 the first appellant, a leader of a group of members of the 
African National Congress operating in Port Elizabeth, had overheard Mrs 
T, the wife of another ANC member, threatening to report her husband to the 
police for harbouring an ANC member. The first appellant reported this 
threat to Joe, another ANC member, who warned that if Mrs T reported the 
matter to the police as threatened, she would be killed. Mrs T was 
subsequently killed. 
Sometime before the murder, the second appellant removed 
explosives from the house in which he was staying to another house. The 
first and the second appellants were subsequently charged with the murder 
of Mrs T. Joe had meanwhile escaped to Lesotho. The trial court found 
both appellants guilty of murder. On appeal it was held that the first 
appellant had effectively dissociated himself from the common purpose 
because he had before the murder voluntarily given evidence to the police 
about his involvement in the ANC. This dissociation was based on the fact 
that the first appellant was intercepted by police in a road-block while he 
was on his way, illegally, to Lesotho. He was arrested because his identity 
document had apparently been forged. It is only at this stage that the first 
appellant volunteered information about his involvement in the ANC. 
136 1990 (3) SA I (A). 
36 
It is, in my submission, difficult to determine what the first appellant 
dissociated himself from. He could not have dissociated himself from a 
common purpose to murder l\1rs T for the following reasons: First, there was 
no prior agreement between Joe and himself to murder the deceased. 
Secondly, the first appellant never actively associated himself with the 
commission of the crime of murder. According to the fonnula in S v 
Mgedezi, 137 in the absence of prior agreement there must be active 
association. Thirdly, he was not present at the scene of murder. 
Any dissociation which did not directly bear on the death of Mrs T is 
irrelevant: the accused were charged with the specific crimes of murdering 
Mrs T and of treason, and not the one of membership of the African National 
Congress. It is also debatable whether the first appellant's withdrawal was 
voluntary because dissociation only took place when he became aware "that 
the police had uncovered the plot." His withdrawal should not have 
constituted a defence. 
Using the formula introduced by Snyman138 it is easy to conclude that 
the first appellant did not have a clear and unambiguous intention to 
withdraw. He failed the Mgedezi test139 for active association simply 
because that test was not applicable in that case. Active dissociation 
assumes that there initially was in existence active association. If there was 
never active association, there will be nothing to dissociate from. In 
131 Op cit (n 44) at 705G-706B. 
ID D' d ·.~ lSCUSSe mJra. 
139 Supra (n 137). 
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S v A1alinga140 effective withdrawal was demonstrated by informing the 
police of a conspiracy. This cannot be equated with what took place in S v 
Nzo. 141 First appellant in the last case referred to was influenced by events 
which he no longer could control. He talked because he had to. 
The above discussion is an attempt to show that withdrawal from the 
common purpose may, in certain circumstances, negative liability. 
Snyman142 advances propositions which fairly reflect our law on the subject 
of dissociation. These are the following: First, in order to escape conviction 
on the ground of a withdrawal from the common purpose, X must have the 
clear and unambiguous intention to withdraw from such purpose. Secondly, 
in order to succeed with a defence of withdrawal, X must perform some 
positive act. Mere passivity on his part cannot be equated with withdrawal. 
Thirdly, the withdrawal must be voluntary. If X withdraws after becoming 
aware that the police had uncovered the plot, the withdrawal is too late and 
does not constitute a defence. Fourthly, the withdrawal will amount to a 
defence only if it takes place at the stage of preparation, that is, before the 
course of events have reached what may be called the "commencement of 
execution." 143 In S v Ndebu 144 the second appellant failed in his appeal 
because his last minute withdrawal did not amount to effective withdrawal. 
He withdrew from the plan at a stage when execution had commenced, that 
is at a stage when it was no longer possible to frustrate the commission of 
140 1963 (1) SA 692 (A). 
141 In S v Nzo first appellant only reported to the police after he had been taken to the police 
station for questioning. Contrary to the general view, it is my strong belief that his actions were 
never voluntary, but that in fact he took the safest option in the circumstances. If he had not 
talked he might have exposed himself to brutality at the hands of the police. 
142 Snyman op cit ( n 3) 254-6. For the discussion below I relied heavily and exclusively on this writer. 
143 See Snyman loc cit and Burchell op cit (n 18) for a full discussion of voluntary withdrawal. 
144 1986 (2) SA 133 (ZS). 
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the crime.145 Firstly, the type of act required for an effective dissociation 
depends upon a number of circumstances. For example, X's chances of 
succeeding with the defence of withdrawal are better if he informs his 
companions of his withdrawal and, if he does this, his chances of succeeding 
are stronger if he also endevours to persuade his companions to desist from 
their plan. 146 
In S v Beahan 147 the appellant had been convicted in the Zimbabwean 
High Court of contravening section 50 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) 
Act Chapter 65 (2), arising from a conspiracy involving the appellant and 
other individuals to release certain prisoners from the lawful custody of the 
Zimbabwean authorities. 
The appellant, a former mercenary soldier, had been offered 
substantial monetary reward should he participate in the plan. The appellant 
also played a role in the recruitment of participants and the co-ordination of 
the enterprise. During the course of implementation of their plan the 
appellant and one other participant were apprehended by the Zimbabwean 
police and customs officials. However, the two managed to escape into 
Botswana from where appellant telephoned to tell his superiors that their 
part of the mission had been unsuccessful. However, the remaining 
participants pursued the rescue plan but were thwarted by the police after a 
security guard had been shot and a stolen helicopter extensively damaged. 
145 s . ft nyman op cit (n 3) comments that "merely to run away (because of timidity or othenvise) a er the 
victim has been physically caught but before he is killed does not qualify as effective withdrawal from 
a common pmpose to murder." 
146 In Sv Nzo supra (n 136) X confessed the whole plan to the police without informing his companions. 
This was considered to have amounted to effective dissociation. 
147 1992 (1) SACR 307 (ZS). 
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The appellant was later arrested in Botswana and brought before court 
in Zimbabwe. He appealed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction as well as 
his alleged dissociation from the common purpose. It was argued for the 
appellant that he had withdrawn from the plan, was not present at the scene 
of the crime and that, by his telephone call to his superior, he had effectively 
dissociated himself. 
The court pointed out that a person who had conspired with others to 
commit a crime but had not commenced an overt act towards the successful 
completion of that crime could effectively withdraw upon timely and 
unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of his decision to abandon 
the common purpose. Where, however, there had been participation in a 
more substantial manner, something further than a communication of 
intention to dissociate was necessary: a reasonable effort to nullify or 
frustrate the effect of his contribution was required. 148 
The court concluded that the appellant's absence from Zimbabwe 
when the freeing of prisoners was carried out, and his notification that the 
mission had failed, did not satisfy the test. Appellant's contention that he 
had withdrawn from the enterprise was accordingly rejected. 
It is submitted that had the appellant attempted to frustrate the plan by 
reporting the matter to the police, or by successfully dissuading his co-
148 These views are shared by Pannanand op cit (n 131) at 185, Snyman op cit (n 3) at 254-6 and Khuluse 
op cit ( n 122) at 173. Pannanand states that "unwillingness to participate in the common design 
together with the presence at the scene could equally be indicative of dissociation, if he has regard to 
the idea of active dissociation vis-a-vis passive dissociation." Also see S v Ndebu supra (n 125), S v 
Nduli supra (n 130) and S v Nomakhlala supra (n 130). 
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perpetrators against going ahead with the original plan, this action would 
have amounted to dissociation from the common purpose. 
41 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of common purpose serves a useful purpose. It assists 
the court where a number of persons, by prior agreement or through active 
association, commit a crime in which it becomes difficult to determine who 
caused the death of the deceased. Where it can be so determined, the 
companions of the perpetrator should not escape liability, because what was 
done by one person was done for the benefit of all members sharing the 
common purpose. It makes sense, therefore, to impute the actions of one to 
all of one's companions, provided that each had culpability with respect to 
the crime committed. 
It is unfortunate that such imputation was stretched beyond its limits 
in S v Nzo. 149 It is also unfortunate that the court accepted that common 
purpose was present in circumstances where the facts of the case clearly 
pointed to the absence of common purpose. It is apparent that in an attempt 
to cast the net too wide in order to ensure that no one will escape, the court 
overlooked the role of the concept of proximity. This is suprising because 
the trend in our law is towards excluding remote possibility even where 
dolus eventualis is under consideration. The judgement in S v Nzo 150 is at 
149 1990 (3) SA ( 1) A In this case the only e\idence against the first appellant was that he overhead and 
reported Mrs T's threats to lay a charge against her husband for harbouring an ANC member. There 
was no evidence of common purpose \\ith respect to the crime of murdering Mrs T. The only 
evidence against the second appellant was that he removed the weapons to another place of safety. 
This does not point to active association at all. 
150 Loe cit. 
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variance with this trend because there \Vas clearly no evidence whatsoever to 
implicate the appellants in the killing of the deceased. 
This doctrine has the unpleasant effect where a person who played a 
relatively minor role gets treated on an equal footing with the dominant 
partner who may have hatched the plan and persuaded the others to join 
in. 151 It is further submitted that in case of assault resulting in death the 
accused whose intentional assault resulted in an unintended death should at 
most be liable for culpable homicide. 152 After all, the common purpose was 
in such a situation formed with respect to assault, and not murder. The 
decision in S v Nkwenja153 is to the effect that the common purpose doctrine 
can be applied in cases of culpable homicide as well. However, in these 
cases the imputation is with respect to causation, and not culpability. 
Further, this approach limits liability to the lesser offence of culpable 
homicide, as opposed to the more serious crime of murder. 
Before the judgement in Motaung154 in 1990, there was great 
confusion as to whether the common purpose doctrine can be applied to a 
"joiner-in." A joiner- in is one who, in the absence of common purpose to 
kill but with intent to kill, joins in a murderous attack after the victim has 
been lethally wounded but while still alive, and whose conduct does not 
151 See S v 11/omakhla/a supra (n 130). The only consolation is that the minor role played by one 
accused may be a mitigating circumstance and affect the punishment to be imposed. 
15
: As Snyman op cit (n 3) 253-4 points out, it is impossible to intend to be negligent. To some people 
this may suggest that the doctrine can never apply to culpable homicide. However, as is clear from s· v 
"A'kwenja 1985 (2) SA 560 (A). the doctrine is applicable in a charge of culpable homicide. 
153 Loe cit. In Sv Kwadi 1989 (3) SA 523 (NC) at 524C-D the court stated that common purpose 
can be applied in respect of culpable homicide but only with reference to causation and not to 
blameworthiness as well. 
154 1990 (4) SA 485 (A). 
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causa11y contribute to the death of the victim. 1='=' In A1otaung15(' the appellate 
division clarified the issue. A person is only liable for murder where there 
was a common purpose to commit murder as evidenced by active association \ 
or prior agreement. Where X joins in a murderous attack before the fatal · 
wound has been inflicted, he may be liable as a perpetrator on the ground of 
active association, because he fulfills all the requirements of the crime of 
157 
murder. Where, however, he joins after the fatal wound has been 
inflicted but while the victim is still alive, he cannot be a perpetrator unless 
he hastened the death of the victim. Assuming that his act had not 
precipitated the victim's death, he can be convicted of attempted murder 
only. 158 In either case there can be no common purpose unless there is 
evidence of prior agreement or active association, in which case the doctrine 
of imputation with apply. 
It is submitted that the courts have successfully refined the doctrine. 
However, it is clear that in the case of S v Nzo159 and S v Yelani 160 courts 
went too far and allowed collateral issues to slip into their enquiries. I 
respectfully submit that it would assist matters greatly if the following 
principles were strictly adhered to: 
155 See Burchell op cit (n 18) 321. 
156 Supra (n 154). 
157 Onth e discussion of a joiner-in also see N Boister "Joining in is clearly less than murder" 1990 
SA CJ 24 ~ Mc Mare "The liability of the joiner-in for murder" 1990 SA CJ l and R Whiting 
"Joining-in" 1986 SAL! 38. 
158 This welcome approach was finally settled in S v Motaung 1990 (4) SA 485 (A) at 521A-B 
where the appellate division rejected the rule in S v Mgxwiti 1954 ( 1) SA 370 (A), which involved 
an application of retrospective criminal liability. Where the accused acceded to the common purpose 
after the \-ictim has been fatally wounded, the accused will be guilty of attempted murder. 
159 Nzo supra (n .49). Some writers argue that S v ."iafatsa supra (n 37) was also badly decided. 
See Duba op cit (n 39) 181. 
160 }' l e ani supra ( n 26 ). This case is discussed in 2 B supra. Yelani cannot be faulted only because it 
was decided before the formula for active association was laid down in Mgedezi. 
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( i) Where the consequence occurs in a manner which differs 
markedly from the way in which the accused foresaw the causal 
sequence the courts should find that the element of intention is 
not satisfied. This approach was adopted in S v Goosen. 161 
(ii) The joiner-in must be convicted of attempted murder if the 
wound inflicted by the joiner-in does not hasten the death of Y. 
If it does, X should be convicted of murder. 162 
(iii) The pre-requisites with respect to active association 
formulated in S v Mgedezi163 must be followed. 
(iv) Those who played a minor role and enjoyed little influence 
over the other members of the group sharing a common 
purpose should be treated more leniently where it appears that 
they did dissociate themselves. This leniency should be 
reflected in the punishment imposed.164 
The above would ensure that problems created by the decision in S v 
Nzo165 will not re-surface. If the above principles are adhered to, this would 
greatly assist in ensuring that liability based on the common purpose 
principle is limited to those instances for which the doctrine was originally 
intended. The principle of proximity would also regain its rightful role of 
limiting the scope of liability. 
161 1989 (4) SA 1013 (A) 1026H-J. 
162 This was laid down in Sv Motaung supra (154) 500F-I. 
163 Mgedezi supra (n42) 705G-706B. 
164 See S v Nomakh/ala supra ( n 130) at 304C. If these principles are adopted, liability based on 
common purpose would be limited rather than extended. 
165 Supra (n 149). 
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The principle of proximity derives from the rules relating to attempt. 
In uncompleted or interrupted attempts166 the problem is to determine 
whether the accused's act amounts to, or falls short of, an attempt. 
An objective test is applied to answer this question. The test requires 
that the acts of the accused in pursuance of his intention must have 
progressed some way towards the completion of the crime before he can be 
liable. This test distinguishes between acts which are remote from, and 
those which are proximate to, the commission of the crime. Remote acts do 
not attract liability even if they are accompanied by intention. They are 
regarded merely as acts of preparation. It is acts which are proximate to the 
commission of the completed crime for which the accused becomes liable. 
These acts have gone beyond the preparation stage and have reached the 
stage of "commencement of execution." 167 These acts attract liability 
because they are proximately linked with the commission of the crime since 
the accused has reached a stage where it could be said it is too late to 
withdraw. Late withdrawal which falls within the "commencement of 
execution" stage cannot save the accused. 
It is respectfully submitted that the second appellant in S v Nzo168 
would not have been held liable for acts which were remotely connected 
with the commission of the crime if the doctrine of proximity was applied. 
Membership of the ANC and the ammunition that was discovered were not 
166 See R v Schoombie 1945 AD 541at545-6 for an exposition of completed and uncompleted 
attempts. 
167 See Snyman op cit (n 3) at 272-6; Burchell and Milton op cit (n 18) at 345-9. 
168 1990 (3) SA l(A). 
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proximately linked to, in particular, the crime of murder. They were, I 
submit, proximately linked only to the acts of sabotage. 
47 
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